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Abstract: The 2011 Arab revolts have often been explained in a somewhat reductionist manner as the last 
chapter of Huntington’s democratization waves and a celebrated march toward secular-liberal democracy, or 
as part of a world-wide revolt against neo-liberal capitalism, or simply as a function of the global expansion 
of capitalism. Rather than reducing these complex events to a single overarching factors, this article argues 
instead that they are better understood with reference to an interplay between global developments (chan-
ges in the international politico-military context) and local politico-economic, psychological, and cultural 
influences. I demonstrate this argument by focusing, from a macro-sociological perspective, on the major 
political-economic, technological, cultural, and psychological factors that helped shape the Arab revolts. 
These include people’s reactions to inequality, lack of economic opportunities, and their demand for econo-
mic justice on the one hand, and their more general aspirations for social and political liberties and justice 
on the other. The article also addresses the impact of information and communications technologies (ICTs) 
on social mobilization and of religion on individual and political culture, and it further argues that these 
factors were complemented by people’s search for dignity (karama) in the face of frustration with oppression 
as well as neoliberal social and economic policies. 
Keywords: Arab revolts, “Arap Spring”, dignity, Islam, Middle East, ICTs, revolutions, social mobilizations. 
Öz: 2011 yılında başlayan Arap İsyanları sık sık indirgemeci bir biçimde bir veya birkaç faktöre dayanarak 
açıklanmakta, seküler-liberal demokrasiye doğru “küresel yürüyüşün” son safhası (veya “demokratikleşme-
nin dördüncü dalgası”), neoliberal kapitalizme karşı bir başkaldırı veya küresel kapitalizmin genişlemesinin 
bir sonucu ve gereği olarak görülmektedir. Bu makale ise bu isyanları daha iyi anlamak için tek bir ana faktö-
re indirgemek yerine uluslararası siyasi-askeri bağlamdaki değişimler çerçevesindeki birtakım küresel geliş-
meler ile yerel siyasi, ekonomik ve psikolojik-kültürel etkilerin dikkate alınması gerektiğini varsaymaktadır. 
Bunun ortaya koymak üzere, makro-sosyolojik bir bakış açısından hareketle bu makalede Arap isyanlarını 
şekillendiren birtakım ana siyasi ve iktisadi, teknolojik, kültürel ve psikolojik faktörler incelenmektedir. Bu 
faktörler, insanların eşitsizlik ve ekonomik özgürlük ve fırsat eşitsizliğine karşı tepkileri ile siyasi ve iktisa-
di adalet talepleri, bilgi-iletişim teknolojilerinin (BİT’ler) toplumsal seferberlik üzerindeki etkileri, İslam’ın 
bireyler ve siyasi kültür üzerindeki etkisi ile bütün bu faktörleri tamamlayan bir psikolojik faktör olarak 
insanların onur (kerame) arayışı ve baskıcı yönetimler ve başarısız neoliberal iktisat politikaları sebebiyle 
rejimlere karşı duyulan öfkeyi ihtiva etmektedir. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Arap isyanları, “Arap Baharı”, onur, İslam, Orta Doğu, iletişim teknolojileri, devrim, 
sosyal hareketler. 
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Introduction
The world is still trying to come to terms with the 2011 Arab revolts, with both its 
causes and its repercussions. Early accounts by many in both the popular media 
and academia viewed them as the last episode of the glorious waves of democrati-
zation in a global march toward secular-liberal democracy, or as a function of ca-
pitalism’s global expansion, or as part of a global revolt against neo-liberal capita-
lism. However, a closer look at this contentious process suggests that these three 
narratives are based on somewhat reductionist, one-sided, and Western-centric 
views that miss the complexities of these massive events, which unfolded across a 
vast region and affected millions of people, and thereby fail to adequately explain 
them. These early accounts have not aged well as they have few exponents today, 
but scholars, politicians, and others have not yet been able to come up with a sa-
tisfactory alternative yet. This paper is an effort to help fill this gap. I argue that 
the Arab revolts can better be explained with reference to an interplay between 
global developments (changes in the international politico-military context) and 
local politico-economic, psychological, and cultural influences. The revolts were a 
complex development that can only be explained by taking into account a diverse 
set of factors.1 
The article demonstrates this argument by revisiting, from a macro-sociological 
perspective, the common factors prevalent in most “Arab Spring” countries. These 
factors include (i) people’s reactions to inequality, lack of economic opportunities, 
and their demand for economic justice and (ii) their more general (and long-opp-
ressed) aspirations for social and political liberties and justice, as well as (iii) the 
urban character of the revolts and the impact of (iv) information and communica-
tions technologies (ICTs) and (v) religion on social mobilization. It also argues that 
these factors were complemented by (vi) participants’ search for dignity in the face 
of frustration with oppression and neoliberal social and economic policies. Before 
embarking upon my analysis, it might be useful to briefly discuss the revolts’ his-
torical background. 
1 In a previous study (Ardıç, 2012a), I examined the complex dynamics of the Arab revolts with reference 
to nine different factors. Here, I focus on only six common factors, revise some of my previous 
arguments in light of more recent literature, and present a deeper empirical analysis with new data. 
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Beneath the Commotion 
Shaped by the international order of the post-World War I era, the “Middle East and 
North Africa” (MENA) have experienced a number of turning points over the past 
century. The first involved the creation of newly independent states in the region 
following the post-World War II decolonization process, including the creation of Is-
rael in 1948. The second break came with the Camp David agreement (1978) and the 
Iranian Revolution (1979). The third, more deeply seated break was the end of the 
Cold War in the 1990s, which disturbed the bi-polar balance of the world order. The 
1991 Gulf War led to rising anti-American sentiment in the region, and the gene-
ral sense of uneasiness with the American occupation of Muslim countries laid the 
psychological ground for the mixed perception of September 11, which constitutes 
the fourth and last critical juncture before the Arab revolts (Ardıç & Duran, 2014). 
The post-9/11 American “War on Terror” campaign and occupation of Afgha-
nistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) resulted in a power vacuum in the MENA region 
which gave Turkey and Iran greater freedom to maneuver and expand their spheres 
of influence. Also, with Iraq sliding into civil war, there remained virtually no major 
power representing the Arab world, for the Mubarak regime in Egypt had already 
lost its credibility on the Arab street because of its US- and Israel-dependent econo-
mic and foreign policies; it also had to shoulder the burden of failed liberalization 
policies that created many injustices, including hyperinflation, soaring unemploy-
ment, and a widening income gap (Kaymakçı, 2012; Pant, 2014; see also the sec-
tion on “political and economic hardships” below). The negative consequences of 
the neo-liberal economic reforms that authoritarian Arab regimes had launched 
based on the Washington Consensus (Rand, 2013) were combined with a crisis of 
national dignity (karama) caused by Western-dependent foreign policies and humi-
liation in the face of Israeli aggression. 
It is no coincidence therefore that the main slogans of the Arab revolts that 
shook some of these authoritarian regimes were “Bread, Freedom, and Dignity” 
and “The people demand the fall of the regime.” The Arab revolts, which initially 
puzzled many, politicians and analysts alike, were not without their own immedia-
te past, either: in addition to the region-wide anti-American/anti-Israeli sentiment 
and protests since the Second Intifada (2000), the Kifaya movement was active in 
2004, and the April 6 movement in 2008 before Tahrir. 
Against the background of these developments, the uprising that began with 
the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia on December 17, 2010, not 
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only led to the demise of the 23-year old regime of Ben Ali, who left the country 
on January 14, 2011, but also gave birth to waves of revolt throughout the MENA 
region that seemed to signal the end of the regional order, a legacy of the Cold War, 
and a move toward a new, more egalitarian order, which to this day remains unrea-
lized. Several internal and external dynamics help account for this. 
Packaging the Arab Revolts
Scholars of political revolutions do not agree on what constitutes a revolution or 
on when exactly a rebellion turns into a revolution (Ardıç, 2012a; cf. Goodwin, 
2001). Different generations of scholars have sought to explain the causes of revo-
lutionary uprisings in a number of ways. Early scholars, e.g. Sorokin (1925), Le Bon 
(1913/2004), explained revolutions through crowd psychology. The second genera-
tion did so by focusing on disequilibrium within the “social system” from a functio-
nalist perspective (Smelser, 1962; Johnson 1966), or on psychological causes (disc-
rimination, frustration, and aggression) (Morrison, 1978; Schwartz, 1971/1997), 
or on resource mobilization and power struggle among different socio-economic 
groups (Huntington, 1968/2006; Tilly, 1978, 1995; see also Stinchcombe, 1995). 
Both generations limited themselves to examining European and American revolu-
tions. A third generation of scholars (e.g., Paige, 1975; Moore, 1978; Skocpol, 1979) 
extended the study of revolutions to non-Western cases and emphasized “external 
factors” (e.g., competition among states) as well as domestic ones (e.g., class confli-
ct, elite struggles). Finally, a fourth generation (e.g., Sewell, 1985; Halliday, 1999) 
have both criticized and refined the earlier literature since the mid-1980s: They 
further expanded the scope of the literature beyond Western conflicts, paid atten-
tion to the role of ideologies and human agency, emphasized the significance of the 
international context, and integrated the study of revolutions with that of social 
movements (see Goldstone, 1980, 2001, 2003; Foran, 1993). Thus, an overview of 
the literature on revolts and revolutions suggests a growing trend toward adapting 
a multi-causal and multi-dimensional approach, which results in a sounder analysis 
of such complex events that avoids reductionism. 
Immediately after the Arab revolts began in December 2010, however, three 
main explanatory frameworks dominated the popular and, to a certain extent, the 
academic literature. One view, rather conspiratorial in tone, explained the revolts 
as driven by capitalism’s need for new markets. This view held that multi-national 
corporations, and the Western politicians they controlled, wished to expand geog-
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raphically to sell their products to new markets. This view ambiguously portrayed 
“transnational capital” as both an omnipotent actor and a helpless creature trying 
to maintain growth but falling in an unrecoverable existential crisis (e.g., Robin-
son, 2011; Jones, 2011).2 
A second narrative, again from a leftist perspective, held that while these “re-
volutions” had started out as anti-imperialist, pro-democratic uprisings, they mi-
ght soon be “stolen” by Western imperialism. In this view, “non-progressive” (i.e., 
non-socialist) participants could be easily co-opted by imperialism and fall prey to 
the West’s imperialist ambitions (e.g., Mackler, 2011; Badio, 2011; Achcar, 2012, 
2013). Another version of this narrative simply claimed that the “Arab Spring” was 
an imperialist conspiracy, as “Americans are directly behind the turbulence or are 
helping the trouble makers [in order to] install new puppets” (Communist Party of 
India, 2012). 
A third, “liberal” narrative was more sympathetic toward this process, portra-
ying it as part of a long march toward secular democracy in the non-Western world 
and as a sign of Islamism’s failure in Muslim society. It assumed that the “color(ed) 
revolutions” in post-communist countries (Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Ser-
bia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova) and others elsewhere (the failed Cedar Revo-
lution in Lebanon [2005] and the fall of governments in the Philippines [2001] 
and Ecuador [2005]) were part of the same singular process that had begun with 
Huntington’s “third wave” of revolutions in 1974. The “Arab Spring” was part of 
the fourth episode of these glorious “waves of democratization,” ending a century 
of “Arab exceptionalism” and spelling the victory of secularism (Huntington, 1991; 
Dobson, 2011; Ergil, 2011; Gershman, 2011; Grand, 2011; Mason, 2011; Taşpınar, 
2011; WMD, 2012). 
All these narratives suffer from reductionism, one-sidedness, and myopia beca-
use they ignore the interplay between internal and external factors that shaped the 
2011 revolts. These Western-centric accounts also deny the participants any agency: 
they imply that the Arab-Muslim people of the “Middle East” cannot exercise any 
true agency in history. They treat these revolts as if they are an outcome of the ope-
2 Some (e.g., Amin, 2010) argued that the “Arab Spring” represented the last great crisis of capitalism 
and would necessarily lead to its collapse and socialism’s rise worldwide. The socialist participants in 
the uprisings, too, often characterized their action as a “fight against global, transnational capital(ism)” 
(e.g., Comrades from Cairo, 2011). Some Western corporations’ perhaps over-eager moves to invest in 
the region (e.g., in Libya after the fall of Qaddafi) fed this image (e.g., Shane, 2011). 
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rations of an “invisible hand” pushing peoples and states toward a universal, socialist 
or liberal, world order—implying the imagined end of history. Moreover, even their 
anti-American/anti-imperialist versions help discursively perpetuate the existing 
US hegemony by reducing the behavior of local actors to no more than the product 
of American/Western agitation, thereby rejecting the possibility of local agency and 
power (see Sayyid, 2011). Though it is true that international powers (particularly 
the USA and Russia) probably tried to develop (multiple and shifting) strategies to 
shape the revolutionary processes in both Eastern Europe and the MENA region, 
attributing these massive processes solely to these plans is implausible.3 
These narratives are reductionist because they reduce the causes of such a 
complex set of events to one single, overarching factor, treating the Arab revolts 
as a function of the capitalistic need for new markets, or of a long global march 
toward democracy led by a metaphysical “invisible hand,” or of an outright Ameri-
can conspiracy. As such, they not only miss the complexity of these events but also 
reproduce the age-old Orientalist prejudices against non-Western peoples, particu-
larly Arabs. Therefore, a sound analysis of this process requires a refined perspecti-
ve emphasizing multiple factors. 
Making Sense of the Arab Revolts: A Multi-Factor Analysis
Scholarly analysis requires a balance between simplifying complex events to make 
them more intelligible and maintaining enough complexity to keep the explanation 
accurate. This can be achieved by limiting the number of causal factors one employs 
as well as avoiding reductionism. Thus my examination adopts a macro-sociologi-
cal perspective focusing only on the common factors that explain why the revolts 
occurred across the Arab world. That world is not monolithic. Different Arab count-
ries have distinct features (see Bellin, 2012; Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2013; 
cf. Altunışık, 2011) and were therefore affected in various ways by the uprisings 
(Delacoura, 2012). But they also share much, including a language, history, and, 
to a lesser extent, ethnicity and religion, as well as certain economic and political 
commonalities.
3 I have previously examined the crucial impact of the changing security environment on the Arab revolts, 
including the lack of superpower support for the regimes, which undermined their legitimacy, and 
the US-led, post-9/11 “War on Terror” campaign, which fundamentally threatened their sovereignty 
(Ardıç, 2012a). 
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It is not uncommon to take transnational regions as a unit of analysis in the 
long tradition of comparative-historical sociology. My analysis here is based on 
a Weberian methodology that favors multi-causal explanation in understanding 
complex human phenomena. Thus, it avoids reducing the causes of the Arab revolts 
to a single all-embracing factor, such as class conflict or religious fervor. Given the 
multiplicity of the backgrounds, social and ideological compositions, and grievan-
ces and demands of the actual participants in the revolts from Tunisia to Yemen, 
a multi-causal approach informed by a macro-sociological perspective is useful in 
explaining this highly complex issue. 
There are three main ways of doing a (historical-)sociological analysis (see Sko-
cpol, 1984): applying a general (theoretical) model to a case or a set of cases; provi-
ding a detailed narrative of case(s) in an interpretive manner; and analyzing case(s) 
by examining certain, significant aspects to make “deterministic” but historically 
specific arguments. Often researchers combine two of these. Here I draw on the 
third, “analytic” approach, but also make a limited use of narrative interpretation. 
My brief analysis is based on six principal factors: people’s search for social 
and economic justice in the face of persistent poverty; their demand for social and 
political liberties; their desire for dignity, stemming from their frustration with 
oppressive regimes; the urban character of the revolts; the impact of ICTs; and the 
impact of Islam. The first three factors (which will be discussed in less detail be-
low as they are more easily detectable) are fundamental causes that were echoed 
by a common slogan chanted across the region: “Bread, freedom, and dignity” (or 
sometimes “Bread, freedom, and justice”). The self-immolation of Mohamed Bou-
azizi in Tunisia in December 2010, which sparked the initial protests, is a semiotic 
microcosm of the entire phenomenon: The 26-year-old Bouazizi might have been 
expected to become an educated, urban professional or civil servant; instead, he 
was denied a regular job and even prevented from working in the informal sector 
as a street vendor after a humiliating encounter with a police officer (Ryan, 2011). 
Facing a life of persistent poverty amid an absence of economic freedoms and the 
pervasive presence of a corrupt, patrimonial, oppressive security state, Bouazizi 
sacrificed his life in protest. 
Political and Economic Hardships 
For decades, most MENA societies were ruled by dictators who, backed by the wor-
ld’s two superpowers, oppressed their own people with an iron rule, particularly 
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through military and police violence. These mukhabarat regimes denied their people 
basic rights and liberties (political participation and freedom of expression, asso-
ciation, travel, etc.) in the name of security and stability (Sayyid, 2011). Recently, 
these human rights abuses, especially the use of violence to suppress dissent and 
the silencing of political opposition, have become more visible thanks to improve-
ments in information technologies, which has further fueled the sense of injustice 
and public anger against the ruling elite (Howard & Hussain, 2013; Salih, 2013). 
People also suffered from perpetual poverty and economic inequalities under 
these regimes, which had established a corporatist system concentrating economic 
resources in the “dynasties” and their cronies. The Mubarak family, for example, is 
estimated to have accumulated a fortune of between $40 billion and $70 billion, 
and 39 officials and businessmen close to Gamal Mubarak made fortunes averaging 
more than $1 billion each (Goldstone, 2011)—all while the masses over whom they 
ruled were mired in economic stagnation and dire poverty. 
For decades, the ruling elites shared their countries’ resources (particularly oil) 
with Western powers or the Soviet Union in return for protection, causing both 
economic and legitimation crises. The ensuing socio-economic problems affected 
many Arab societies during at the turn of the century. For instance, according 
to a 2005 official Egyptian survey, 92% of all those unemployed were below the 
age of 30. About half of all the unemployed were in the 20–25 age group, with an 
unemployment rate between 30 and 40% during the 1995–2005 period.4 Moreo-
ver, unemployment was much higher among the better educated, and three times 
higher among women than men. 
During the run-up to the revolts, blatant corruption among the elites fueled 
public anger against them and increased the income gap between them and the 
masses (Lesch, 2011; Winckler, 2013). Furthermore, the failure of neo-liberal poli-
cies across the Arab world created high rates of unemployment and inflation and a 
large income gap, causing the middle class to remain small in size—creating “midd-
4 According to UN statistics, half the population of the MENA region was under the age of 25 at the 
time of the revolts and the number of 15–24 year olds had doubled in the previous 30 years, increasing 
from 44.6 million in 1980 to 88.1 million in 2010. Also, the median age for MENA countries, excluding 
Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain, was below the world average (29) in 2010: 24 for Egypt, 21 for Syria 
and Jordan, and 17 for Yemen. Furthermore, it was primarily the young who were hurt the most by 
worsening economic conditions: over 80% of the unemployed were below the age of 30 in Egypt in 
2006, and 82% of the unemployed had never worked before; similarly, about 75% of the unemployed 
were under 30 in Jordan in 2007 (Roudi, 2011, pp. 2–5; cf. Assaad & Barsoum, 2007). See Hoffman and 
Jamal (2012) for a critical examination of the role of the youth in the Arab revolts. 
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le-class poverty,” particularly in Egypt (Ibrahim, 2002a; Kuhn, 2012; Adeel & Awa-
dallah, 2013; Alexander & Bassiony, 2014). Austerity measures imposed as part 
of structural-adjustment programs and the impact of the recent global financial 
crisis resulted in a region-wide 32% rise in food prices in 2010 (Ianchovichina et al., 
2015) and a soaring youth unemployment rate of 26%, double the global average, 
in 2011. (It would also exceed 27% the next year—see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Youth unemployment in the Arab world, 2008–2015 
Source: World Bank (2018)
Rising education levels across the region raised expectations among the young. 
But governments’ efforts to expand the public sector could not keep up with the 
rapid population growth in the region (Bteddini, 2012), leading to frustration with 
the increasing difficulty of securing public-sector employment and leaving many 
people unemployed or in low-paying and ill-suited private sector jobs (UN ESCWA, 
2014). The unemployment rates were also slightly higher in urban areas (Hassan 
& Sassanpour, 2008, pp. 4–7). Furthermore, 25% of self-employed households in 
non-agricultural sectors were poor (El-Laithy et al., 2003). 
At the country level, likewise, there were stark differences between poor count-
ries and a small of group of oil-rich ones: Saudi Arabia’s per capita income was more 
than ten times that of Yemen—$24,020 vs. $2,330 in 2009 (Roudi, 2011, p. 3). 
Therefore, political-economic problems, especially those of the educated, urbani-
zed population, played a significant role in the emergence of the revolts (see also 
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Campante & Chor, 2012; Ansani & Daniele, 2012; Bayat, 2015; Ianchovichina et 
al., 2015; ‘Ayasira, 2016). As Perry Anderson (2011) has observed, 
Beneath the commotion now shaking the Arab world have been volcanic social pres-
sures: polarization of incomes, rising food prices, lack of dwellings, massive unemp-
loyment of educated—and uneducated—youth, amid a demographic pyramid without 
parallel in the world (p. 9).
Search for Dignity
The psychological drive underlying the move to stand up and speak out against 
these political and economic hardships was the search for dignity and respect (kara-
ma) by the long-oppressed and humiliated people of the Arab world. The effects of 
perpetual inequality and poverty were exacerbated by exposure to continuous vi-
olence and humiliation, widespread corruption, patrimonial-clientelistic relations, 
and favoritism, which further alienated the masses from the elites (see Davutoğlu, 
2012). For instance, a survey by the Egyptian Information and Decision Support 
Center reported that 70% of jobs were secured through favoritism in 2007 (Hassan 
& Sassanpour, 2008, p. 11). Research also shows that people in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, 
Tunisia, and Egypt were among the world’s least happy people, especially in ter-
ms of their dissatisfaction with the quality of public services (Ianchovichina et al., 
2015). The people’s desire for dignity and respect and their anger and frustration 
at a long history of discrimination, nepotism, poverty, and violence were reflected 
in the slogans protesters adopted across the MENA region: “The people demand 
the fall of the regime,” often combined with a call for karama (Dunne, 2013). Thus, 
concludes Gerges (2014), 
a unifying thread runs through all of [the revolts]: a call for dignity, empowerment, 
political citizenship, social justice, and taking back the state from presidents-for-life, as 
well as their families and crony capitalists who hijacked it. 
Similarly, Delacoura (2012) observes that “more than anything else, the rebel-
lions were a call for dignity and a reaction to being humiliated by arbitrary, unac-
countable and increasingly predatory tyrannies” (p. 67). This factor probably hel-
ped the participants transcend the threshold of fear, the main psychological barrier 
to such a risky endeavor, as was also the case in the Palestinian Intifada.
Coupled with the regime violence and oppression they faced domestically, ano-
ther factor affecting the Arab-Muslim people’s motivations and underlying desire 
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for karama in the run-up to the revolts was likely the decades-long history of hu-
miliation by, and political-military failures against, Israel. The recent roots of this 
“awakening” go back to the early 2000s, when people across the Muslim world took 
to the streets in solidarity with the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000) and, later, 
to protest against the US invasion of Iraq (2003): 
In Egypt as elsewhere, the upsurge in democratic activism was not born in a vacuum. 
For many young activists in Egypt, the second intifada was the initial galvanising event 
that bonded their hitherto isolated voices. The anti-Iraq war movement … marked its 
coalescence. (Azimi, 2005; cf. Nez-à-Nez, 2011) 
This activism, essentially born as a reaction to these two developments, eventu-
ally culminated in more organized movements (and sometimes coalitions of groups 
with different ideological agendas) targeting more specific issues—for example, 
the Kifaya movement, a coalition of Islamic and secular activists formed in Egypt 
in 2004–2005 to prevent Mubarak’s re-election. However, Kifaya could not turn 
into a mass movement, partly because of the Ikhwan’s reluctance to cooperate with 
them (Gerges, 2018, p. 363; cf. Azimi, 2005). These diverse groups (including many 
ordinary citizens) took to the streets and squares again in 2011. 
The Urban Setting 
The Arab revolts took place primarily in urban settings, rather than in rural areas 
turning into guerilla warfare – except for the protracted cases of Syria and Libya. 
Protests were mostly organized in streets and squares (notoriously Cairo’s Tahrir 
and Tripoli’s Green/Martyrs’ squares), on campuses and in conference halls, and 
in the virtual space that was an integral part of urban life. Thus the “Arab city” 
functioned as the physical and social space of struggle: it played a role as the major 
site where protests were organized, the masses were mobilized, and, ultimately, 
the regimes stepped in to repress the protesting city residents. Even in Libya, some 
cities stood out as major sites of massacre, bombing, resistance, and revolution, 
namely, Benghazi, Tripoli, Sirte, and Misrata; whereas Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, 
and Dara’a functioned as the centers of action in Syria (Saleh, 2017). An important 
consequence of the revolts’ urban character was the peaceable character of the pro-
testers: they frequently adopted the strategy of occupying and camping on squares 
and streets, helping minimize “revolutionary violence” (unlike the regimes).
Furthermore, the city and its squares also functioned as the “democratic space 
of revolutionary occupation” (Döşemeci, 2011) during the revolts. This was par-
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ticularly the case with Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the symbolic (and actual) site of the 
abortive Egyptian revolution. The activists’ main strategy was to physically occupy 
the square: for three weeks, hundreds of thousands of them stayed in Tahrir day 
and night. While regime forces gradually withdrew, protestors grew in number, at 
times up to a million people— especially on Fridays. This paradoxically resulted 
in both an opportunity and a challenge for the activists: They owned the square, 
showing their power and determination, but they also had to provide their own 
food, security, and cleaning and health services. Thus, they shared both the joy and 
the responsibility of their collective action in Tahrir Square. Armed with socio-e-
conomic, political, and psychological motivations in the face of frustrated expec-
tations, these urban participants of the Arab revolts made effective use of another 
weapon: information and communication technologies.
The ICTs as “Weapons of Mass Communication”
Although streets and squares hosted many of the protests, much collective action 
was organized in virtual space, too—another urban characteristic of the revolts. 
The Arab revolts were the first of their kind, where large-scale demonstrations were 
relatively easily organized across different countries thanks to the use of previously 
unavailable ICTs, including “social media” (particularly Facebook and Twitter), cell 
phones, and satellite TV networks. While some observers were skeptical of social 
media’s impact (e.g., Gladwell, 2011; Heaven, 2011; Kravets, 2011; Penny, 2011; 
Lawson, 2015), an empirical analysis of over three million tweets, gigabytes of You-
Tube content, and thousands of blog posts during the protests suggests that they 
actually “played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring” by 
spreading … inspiring stories of protest and “democratic ideas across international 
borders” (Howard et al., 2011, p. 2; cf. McGarty et al., 2014). 
When discussing the impact of technology, however, one should be careful to 
avoid technological determinism: Although modern technology is not simply an 
instrument that actors use however they wish, as it can and does influence soci-
al relations within circumstances imposed by the socio-historical context, it does 
not have an agency of its own, either (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). Technology 
does not exist in a vacuum—its influence occurs only in and through social relati-
ons, including military and political power relations, economic interests, normati-
ve meaning systems, and even ideological drives. Thus, actors’ use of ICTs during 
the Arab revolts is only meaningful in the context of the social circumstances that 
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conditioned them. For example, during much of 2011 it was the young protestors, 
rather than the regimes ruled by old people, who made the most effective use of 
Twitter and Facebook for organizational purposes (Howard & Hussain, 2013).5 
As products of ongoing globalization and technological revolution, ICTs func-
tioned as “weapons of mass communication” (Mann, 2003) against these regimes. 
Three forms of ICTs stood out as crucial: the satellite TV, the cell phone, and the 
internet, including WikiLeaks, which helped start the protests in Tunisia by reve-
aling the dirty secrets of the regime, particularly the Ben Ali family’s corruption 
and wealth (see e.g., WikiLeaks, 2009). Activists used ICTs in different ways and 
to different degrees: While text-messaging probably played a limited part because 
of its geographical limits, though it was important in organizing protests (Kravets, 
2011), protesters created many Facebook pages, using them together with Twitter 
and text-messaging in organizing, communicating with fellow demonstrators, and 
spreading their messages (and pictures) across the globe (Ackerman, 2011; Bec-
kett, 2011; J. Rosen, 2011; R. Rosen, 2011; Vargas, 2011; Hussain & Howard, 2013; 
Bayat, 2013). In Tunisia, for instance, where the internet was routinely censored, 
while there were some 800,000 Facebook users in October 2009, this number reac-
hed 1.97 million, almost a fifth of Tunisia’s total population and over half of its in-
ternet users, by the time Ben Ali fled the country in January 2011 (Pollock, 2011). 
ICTs also provided activists with an opportunity to gain worldwide recogniti-
on, legitimacy, and solidarity and undermined the legitimacy of autocratic regimes. 
Some were aware of this: The Mubarak regime shut down nearly all internet activity 
on January 28, 2011, including the “withdrawal of more than 3,500 Border Ga-
teway Protocol (BGP) routes by Egyptian ISPs.” Aimed at blocking communication 
among activists, this ban resulted in the shutting down of 88% of Egyptian inter-
net access that day (Williams, 2011). Similarly, Qaddafi ordered the internet to be 
shut down in Libya as of February 18, 2011 (Reuters, Feb. 19, 2011). Finally, social 
media also made the news coverage of the events more pluralistic, partly breaking 
the monopoly and manipulation of (particularly Western) media conglomerates 
(Schillinger, 2011).
On the other hand, satellite news networks such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya 
often worked in conjunction with social media during the revolts. The total num-
5 The Syrian Ba’ath regime was an exception, however: There were not only many pro-Assad Facebook sites 
but also a number of online activists who called themselves the “Syrian Electronic Army” and waged a 
cyber war against opposition targets (see Syrian Electronic Army, 2012; Amos, 2011; Noman, 2012). 
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ber of TV networks broadcasting in Arabic was estimated to be 700 (Fandy, 2007), 
with the pro-opposition networks providing alternative perspectives on news and 
opinion. They also often integrated social media and their own websites into their 
coverage. This was particularly true for Al Jazeera, which had long been an impor-
tant news source and had a reputation for independence and professionalism. But 
it was during the Arab revolts that its influence and popularity skyrocketed: 
Al Jazeera has consistently been able to influence public opinion. Many Arab rulers had 
accused it of inciting protest and dissent. Undoubtedly, the role Al Jazeera played in 
the Arab Spring was unprecedented, especially during the Tunisian and Egyptian up-
risings. Many Tunisians credited the channel with speeding the overthrow of Ben Ali’s 
regime.… The role of Al Jazeera in inspiring the Libyan and Yemeni protesters is also 
undeniable. (Souaiaia, 2011)
These ICTs also produced a “demonstration effect”: Success stories spread just 
as fast as stories of oppression and violence across the region, not only raising 
awareness about human rights violations but also showing that it was possible do 
something about them (Lesch, 2013). Thus, the pioneering activists in Tunisia and 
Egypt showed others that toppling a dictator was achievable. They also showed 
them the tactics and tools to be used for successful protests.6 The strategy of oc-
cupying physical settings, in particular, seems to have influenced some other mo-
vements around the globe, as it was replicated in US cities (with the “Occupy Wall 
Street” movement), London, Tel Aviv, Istanbul, and even Beijing. Another somew-
hat peculiar feature of the revolts was the role played by religion in mobilizing and 
motivating protesters, which is often neglected by analysts (e.g. Bamyeh, 2011; 
Zubaida, 2011). 
The Role of Religion in the Arab Revolts
The positive association between religiosity and political mobilization has been 
well documented (e.g., Johnston & Figa, 1988; Harris, 1999; Jamal, 2005). While 
the Arab revolts were the product of a variety of groups with differing demands, 
expectations, motivations, and ideologies, from liberals and socialists to Islamists 
6 Journalist William Dobson reported that Mohamed Adel, a youth leader he interviewed in Cairo, 
emphasized the impact of Tunisian protesters on their own Egyptian revolution in early 2011 
(Dobson, 2011). Similarly, Carl Gershman reported that Sam Rainsy, a Cambodian exile, told him that 
“They [Middle Eastern activists] showed that it can be done. Now people have the idea that change is 
possible, and that’s the most important thing of all” (Gershman, 2011). 
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and “ordinary” religious people (Nugent, Jamal, & Masoud, 2016), the common de-
mand for regime change and justice had an inclusive appeal, bringing many toget-
her from different corners of the Arab street and making their ideological divides 
less palpable. I argue, however, that Islam was the strongest of these ideologies 
(broadly conceived) and appealed to the most people. Its influence was also the 
most visible compared to others, particularly liberalism and secularism—though 
socialists were a vocal minority. Thus, Hoffman and Jamal’s statistical analysis on 
Egypt and Tunisia (2014) shows that “the Arab Spring protests were not, in gene-
ral, motivated by anti-religious sentiment. On the contrary, individuals who read 
the Qur’an more often were three to four times as likely as others to participate in 
the protests” (p. 600).
Islam affected both Islamists and the wider “political culture” (used here in a 
broad sense to refer to a set of underlying values and symbols upon which narrower 
ideological doctrines and party politics draw) as well as the psychological motivati-
ons of many people to participate in demonstrations. For instance, when leaders of 
Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) announced Qaddafi’s death at a press 
conference, “even secular Muslim journalists started chanting ‘Allahu Akbar!’” The 
NTC further announced that Islamic sharia would be adopted as the main source of 
law in Libya after the revolution (Abu Toameh, 2011). 
Because Islam has historically been one of the most powerful social forces in 
shaping political culture in the Arab world, it is no surprise that Islamic concepts 
and symbols were a significant ideological background factor that left a mark upon 
the revolts.7 Furthermore, Islamic movements have always been the main thre-
at to the oppressive regimes in the region (Ibrahim, 2002b; Rosefsky-Wickham, 
2002; Hirschkind, 2006). Many Islamic groups, particularly the Ikhwan in Egypt 
and Syria, were armed with an ideological repertoire for resistance derived from 
a politicized interpretation of Islamic activism. They also played a significant role 
in combating the region’s widespread poverty and inequality through their vast 
network of charity organizations and volunteers, for they were “able to work th-
rough mosques and charities, and [had] the ability to dispense goods, services and 
jobs,” all of which “became ever more important after the withdrawal of state ser-
vices and subsidies” (Zubaida, 2011). 
7 For an analysis of Islam’s significant role in shaping the political culture among both Islamists and 
secularists in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, India, and Turkey during the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, see Ardıç 2012b. 
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Islamic opposition groups often had to fight against the perception that they 
represented an “Islamist threat,” a perception successfully marketed by the regimes 
“via the state-controlled press, state-owned think-tanks and universities” (Brum-
berg, 2011). They did so by working through mosques, charities, and alternative 
media.8 Always working under state pressure, these Islamic groups enhanced civil 
networks from the bottom up to bring middle-class people, professionals in parti-
cular, into closer contact with lower-class citizens through communal and charity 
activities. They thus fostered trust and emotional solidarity “along these horizontal 
lines, indirectly leading to the development of new social networks and, potential-
ly, the diffusion of new ideas” (Clark, 2004, p. 4). They also frequently capitalized 
on the failed neo-liberal policies that had, since the 1980s, “led to the transfer of 
state assets to a narrow circle of cronies around the dynasties of ruling figures, ope-
ning the way for much gain through contracts, licenses and rampant corruption” 
(Zubaida, 2011).
Though these Islamic movements were not always the initiators of revolts as 
organized movements, they were actively involved in determining the course of 
the events. For instance, Sarra Grira of France 24 reported on April 5, 2011, that 
“Islamists are at the forefront of anti-government protests” even in relatively secu-
lar Tunisia (Grira, 2011). Hoffman and Jamal (2014, p. 601) show that support for 
political Islam had a positive impact on participation in protests generally, despite 
some variation among different countries. Moreover, Islamic activism was at the 
center of the recent “Arab Awakening”: the protests by millions of people throu-
ghout the Muslim world against Israeli aggression leading to the Second Intifada 
(2000) and the American occupation of Iraq (2003) helped, as discussed above, 
prepare the ground for the 2011 revolts. 
Islam’s role was evident in the slogans and discourses of the activists, too: many 
chanted “God is Great,” referred to different Qur’anic verses and Islamic idioms, 
called the victims of revolutions “martyrs,” and prayed collectively during demons-
trations. Individual religiosity was also strongly correlated with participation in 
the protests (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014, pp. 600–602). Furthermore, many Islamic 
groups actively participated in the protests from the very beginning: for instance, 
8 Hirschkind (2006) has shown that Islamic opposition groups in Egypt and elsewhere effectively 
employed a popular Islamic media form, the cassette sermon, which they had for decades produced and 
distributed via clandestine methods to spread their messages. In this way, they were able to produce 
an “ethical soundscape” and different forms of Islamic “counterpublics,” thereby transforming the 
political geography of the region. 
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although Islamic political activism had for a long time been suppressed and remai-
ned relatively invisible in Egypt, the Ikhwan, which initially preferred to keep a low 
profile, played a leading role in both organizing the demonstrations and providing 
political and logistical support for the activists in Egypt (Rosefsky-Wickham, 2002, 
2011; Abu Toameh, 2011; Hessler, 2011). 
Unlike many global media outlets and analysts who often downplayed the role 
of religion (e.g., Bamyeh, 2011; Brumberg, 2011; Rock-Singer, 2011; Grand, 2011; 
Zubaida, 2011), some Western politicians were aware of its importance: In fact, du-
ring the first days of the Egyptian revolution (Feb. 2, 2011) when Mubarak’s sup-
porters—armed and mounted on camels—attacked the protestors in Tahrir Squa-
re, Tony Blair congratulated Mubarak and warned him “against a rush to elections 
that could bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power” (The Guardian, Feb. 2, 2011). 
As the results of the first round of elections (December 2011) show, Blair was right 
to expect a Brotherhood victory: the Brotherhood’s FJP got approximately 40% of 
votes and won 49% of seats in the parliament, and the salafi-oriented al-Nur Party 
received over 20% of votes. Similarly, in Tunisia, the Islamic opposition, led by the 
En-Nahda movement, regularly participated in the anti-government demonstra-
tions and won the subsequent elections with a clear margin (Beissinger, Jamal, & 
Mazur, 2015). Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which was less popular than En-Nahda, was also at 
the forefront of the protests in Tunisia (Grira, 2011). 
Moreover, the choices of Islamic groups in some cases played a decisive role 
in how the revolts affected the regime. For instance, when King Muhammad VI 
of Morocco conceded the constitutional amendments enacted in June 2011 that 
allowed more political participation and enhanced the parliament’s authority, the 
Islamist opposition led by the Justice and Development Party accepted these com-
promises.  The King also promised that Islam would still be kept as the basis of law 
and national identity in the revised constitution (Brumberg, 2011). 
On the other hand, not only Islamic movements but also other participants 
drew on the rich repertoire of anti-oppression and justice-centered content found 
in the cultural “toolbox” provided by Islamic sources, including the Qur’an (e.g., 
2:193, 16:90, 42:39), the prophetic traditions, and the Islamic tradition in general. 
As Hoffman and Jamal (2014) observed, in both Egypt and Tunisia, “Qur’an rea-
ders are significantly more likely to perceive inequalities in their treatment from 
the regime and are more supportive of democracy than are nonreaders” (p. 603). 
Moreover, Friday prayers and sermons, already an important venue for spreading 
Islamic messages, became increasingly politicized during the revolts. Thus, largest 
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demonstrations in Tahrir Square in 2011 took place following some of the (colle-
ctive) Friday prayers. Furthermore, many mosques, particularly those controlled 
by the Brotherhood, functioned as logistical centers for the protests and as a locus 
of anti-government agitation (The Telegraph, 2011; Hessler, 2011). In the words of 
one journalist with no great affection for Islamism,
What many Western observers have failed to notice is that most of the antigovernment 
demonstrations that have been sweeping the Arab world over the past ten months were 
often launched from mosques following Friday prayers. This is especially true regarding 
Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Jordan. (Abu Toameh, 2011)
Likewise, prominent religious leaders played an important role, both from the 
pulpit and through ICTS, by repeatedly condemning oppression and calling on pe-
ople to join anti-regime protests across the region. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for 
example gave a sermon on February 21, 2011, a few days into the Libyan revolt, at 
a Friday prayer attended by tens of thousands of people in Tahrir, where he congra-
tulated the Egyptian revolutionaries and urged the Libyans to join the insurgency. 
In a later interview with Al Jazeera, he condemned Qaddafi’s violent reaction to 
the protests and issued a fatwa calling for his assassination (Michot, 2011). He 
further called on Muslim governments to recognize the NTC and send arms and 
ammunition to Libyan rebels (Gulf Times, 2011). Al-Qaradawi also issued several 
fatwas and declarations encouraging Syrians to fight against Bashar al-Assad and 
condemning him for his oppression (e.g., al-Qaradawi, 2012). Al-Qaradawi spoke 
to audiences throughout the region through his fatwas and speeches, which were 
widely circulated in the Muslim world, and his popular TV program “Sharia and 
Life” on Al Jazeera, which attracted “tens of millions [of viewers] worldwide” (Kirk-
patrick, 2011; cf. Rock-Singer, 2011).
Finally, activists from Tunisia to Egypt often voiced their sympathy with the 
Palestinian cause against Israel; Hamas in turn announced its full support for the 
Syrian opposition organized under the Free Syrian Army. Therefore, Zubaida’s 
(2011) claim that the Tunisian “Jasmine” and the Egyptian “Nile” revolutions “se-
emed to eschew religion and nationalism in favour of classic political demands of 
liberty, democracy and economic justice” does not hold much water. It also misses 
the fact that common elements of the demands across the region—namely, justice 
and the overthrow of tyranny—had already been the core elements of the Islamic 
opposition’s discourse. Therefore, the widespread view in the West that associates 
democracy with secularization was shown once again to be misleading (see also 
Esposito, 2011; Filali-Ansary, 2012; Hoffman & Jamal, 2014; cf. Ardıç, 2012b). 
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Conclusion
The Arab revolts and the aspirations and demands of educated urban people for 
justice, dignity, affluence, and freedom initially promised to reshape the MENA re-
gion. Emerging in the context of a long history of oppression, corporatist economic 
structures, and Western (and previously Soviet) intrusion in the region, the revolts 
were due in part to the pressing impact of international structures and institutions 
upon the autocratic regimes of the region and in part to the internal contradictions 
and dynamics of Arab societies themselves. Therefore, these revolts should not be 
seen as a result of an imperialist conspiracy or as part of a class-based, internatio-
nal uprising against capitalism, nor as the last episode or “wave” of the purported 
global democratization process that has been ongoing since the 1990s. 
Instead, the Arab revolts can be explained only with reference to multiple fac-
tors, some of which have been discussed here, including political and economic cri-
ses and people’s reaction to them, as well as people’s search for dignity and respect 
in the face of a long history of corruption, oppression, and domestic and foreign 
humiliation. My analysis has also addressed the roles played by Islam and ICTs, 
particularly social media and news networks, as well as the urban character of the 
protests. Some other factors, however, were excluded from the analysis, such as 
the different roles (active vs. passive) played by armies in different states and the 
changing regional security context due to international interventions and shifts in 
superpower backing (see note 1, above). 
The impact of these multiple factors underlines the inadequacy of the abo-
ve-mentioned reductionist narratives, which are more ideological than scholarly. 
These narratives also reflect the initial optimism by many in the West with regard 
to the direction of the revolts—that they would result in a better, more democratic 
future. Like earlier politico-military developments in the region, including mili-
tary coups d’état and the speedy rise and spread of authoritarian regimes across 
the Arab world, from Nasser’s Egypt to Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, 
the revolts that started in Tunisia and reached their peak in Tahrir Square, too, 
were thought to be spreading at a fast pace (Owen, 2012, p. 374; Saleh, 2017 p. 7). 
For Dallmayr (2011, p. 640), for example, the “Egyptian democratic revolution” of 
2011–2012 represented one of the three principal responses of the Muslim world 
to Western modernity—the others being Turkey’s secular Kemalist revolution and 
Iran’s Islamic revolution. For him, this new revolution had the potential to solve 
the problems of state-religion relations arising from Kemalist laïcité and Iranian 
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theocracy by producing an alternative democratic model that would find a healthy 
synthesis between Islam and democracy. Likewise, Dabashi (2012) claimed that 
the “Arab Spring” would end the colonial era (and even the existing “post-colonial” 
order) in the region. 
However, it quickly became clear that democratic transition in the MENA regi-
on would be much harder than it had been in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Pillar, 
2011, p. 18), for the US and Europe did not change their attitude toward the region 
and continued to support its authoritarian regimes based on their strategic calcu-
lations —the security of the region’s oil, the war on terror, preserving the pro-Wes-
tern balance of power, controlling migration, etc. Thus, they refused to risk “en-
dangering” their “vital interests” by betting on a potential Arab democracy (Hollis, 
2012). The autocratic regimes, too, were successful in suppressing civil society and 
reproducing their authoritarianism (Springborg, 2011, pp. 5–6). 
Though the Arab revolts could have been an important turning point for the 
region, promising a paradigmatic change in terms of popular legitimacy, this chan-
ge has largely been aborted, indicating that a democratic transition will at best be 
a long and challenging process. Though Islamic movements were initially thought 
to have benefited from these revolts the most, this proved not to be the case. The 
Ikhwan was declared a terrorist organization after the 2013 Egyptian coup, and 
En-Nahda has been experiencing some hardships in Tunisia, both of which signal a 
new political environment in which the very existence of Islamic movements is se-
curitized. Consequently, the opportunity to integrate Islamic movements into the 
democratic process and thereby to prevent their potential radicalization has been 
missed. The Gulf countries, moreover, managed to escape the potentially transfor-
mative process right from the start—Bahrain being a partial exception. 
The democratic-secularism narrative criticized here might have played into the 
Western powers’ response to the revolts in such a way that not only democracy 
failed but secularism (if it was happening at all) failed too. This has increased the 
oppression under which religious groups operate, alienating them from the democ-
ratic process, and likely making them less inclined to pursue in peaceful democratic 
reform movements in the future. This could spell trouble not just for the future of 
democracy in the region, but for the future security of the West and its interests 
as well.
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